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[II]
Combating a Religious Radical Ideology v. Suppressing Islamic Opposition:
Jordan’s Approach to Counterterrorism

A. Introduction
In examining various case studies of states’ responses to terrorism, classifying response options
was the most common way of analyzing the main trends in a certain response over a specific
period of time, particularly in respect to legislation and policy practices. For example, Western
responses to terrorism – pre and post 9/11 – are seen to typically fall into two basic forms of a
repressive response; the legal repressive model or what Ronald Crelinsten calls criminal justice
model and the war model. 1 In using these two models or a hybrid of both, each western country
has developed an independent approach to countering terrorism that reflects the different ways in
which security has been understood, and highlights particular issues related to its history.

Overall, states concerns about terrorism have given rise to important questions of practice and
principle concerning the emergence in many of those countries of a new broad antiterrorism
regimes or the revitalization in other countries of older antiterrorism measures. Concerns about
the abrogation of civil and political rights and a return to martial rule eras have dominated most
debates. While there is much literature on the legal, diplomatic and military responses to
terrorism, particularly the more coercive or repressive kinds of responses, and their clash with
the many western liberal traditions, there is very little on what can be called an ‘ideological’
response to terrorism, and almost none on its impact on societies especially those living under
1

RONALD CRELINSTEN, Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and
the Controlled, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, 3-23 (Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart
eds., 1987).
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some form of authoritarian rule, wherein measures taken are politically motivated rather than
driven by an all-risk approach to security issues.

Most contemporary experiences with terrorism, whether in the west, east or the south, have been
connected with Islamic extremism and it is this that has shaped most significantly governments’
responses. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [“9/11
Commission”] concluded in its final report 2 - the present general threat throughout the world is
the spread of a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world that spawned terrorist groups
and violence against its own societies as well as against foreign targets. In order to cut off the
supply of recruits to this movement, eliminate its financial support networks, and prevent it from
metastasizing into new regions and social pockets require an effective response that would
ultimately undermine the movement’s ideological appeal. That should not, however, be allowed
to tempt us to underestimate the importance of repressive approaches to counterterrorism or
oversimplify the decisive political, religious and historical forces that are at play.

Political science and security experts agree that thus far counterterrorism is nowhere close to
approaching that effective counter-ideological approach against al-Qaeda or the radical
ideological movement it represents. 3 The United States and its western allies past experience in
waging successful campaigns against ideologies such as fascism and communism is currently
seen inadequate to reach Muslim audiences. There is broad consensus that far more needed to be
done to discredit the religious viewpoint that drives continued radicalization and recruitment.

2

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, 363 (U.S. Government Printing Office 2004).
3
BRIAN M JENKINS, Introduction by Jenkins, in TERRORISM: WHAT’S COMING: THE MUTATING
THREAT, 16 (James O. Ellis III ed., Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 2007).
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Thus, it is clear to most informed observers that the counter-ideological approach of any
antiterrorism response is a serious problem anywhere. But nowhere has it seemed more
problematic than it does in Muslim or Muslim majority jurisdiction. Since 9/11, particularly after
Iraq, the prevailing perception among many Muslim countries 4 aided by the radical ideological
movement and elements of the news media that the United States and its western allies are
locked in a “war on Islam.” 5 And, many Muslim governments that are key allies to the United
States are by proxy accused of enacting legislation and policy that is at heart anti-Islamic.

It is important to note that focusing on regional and national peculiarities does not automatically
dismiss the presence of common challenges and similarities in counterterrorism laws and policies
around the world. As discussed in previous part, counterterrorism law and policy may frequently
be shaped at international and regional levels, but it also often has particular domestic uses. In
many places, including Jordan, post-9/11 developments in antiterrorism legislation and policy

4

A May 2004 Pew survey showed that 53 percent of Jordanians and 51 percent of Pakistanis believe the real
purpose of the war on terror is to target unfriendly Muslims governments and groups. See, PEW GLOBAL
ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA’S IMAGE IN THE WORLD: FINDINGS FROM THE PEW GLOBAL
ATTITUDES PROJECT (2007), available at: http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019.
And a 2005 Pew study found that in all five majority Muslim countries surveyed, solid majorities said they worried
that the United States might become a military threat to their country. PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT,
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM: COMMON CONCERN FOR MUSLIM AND WESTERN PUBLICS: SUPPORT FOR
TERROR
WANES
AMONG
MUSLIM
PUBLICS
(2005),
available
at:
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248
5
According to a survey conducted by in 2004 by Zogby International for the Project on Muslims in the American
Public Square, a project run out of Georgetown's Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, more than one-third
of American Muslims believe that the U.S. war on terrorism is really a war on Islam. This survey was a follows up
study conducted two months after the September 11 attacks, which found that 67 percent of American Muslims
believed that the United States was fighting a war on terror. An additional 18 percent of Muslims said the U.S. war
was against Islam, and 16 percent said they were not sure. See, More than third of U.S. Muslims see war on Islam,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, October 20, 2004, http://www.washtimes.com/news/2004/oct/19/20041019-1152413792r/
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can only be fully understood in the context of past historical concerns and current geopolitical
realities. 6

Jordan’s experience with terrorists incidents and threat, suggests that measures against terrorism,
whether national or international in nature, are unlikely to be fully effective in the absence of
appropriate political action to deal with legitimate grievances or double standards in dealing with
national unrest or international crises. The government is aware that issues of inequality,
discrimination, and controversial foreign policies may lie behind or contribute to the
radicalization of its political opponents, thus their possible resort to terrorism.

This paper aims to highlight the main characteristics of Jordan’s response to terrorism, in
particular, its distinctive approach to counterterrorism post-9/11. The main argument advances a
less often considered response option that addresses political capabilities, what Martha Crenshaw
terms “de-legitimation,” that is, policies and practices designed to decrease the legitimacy of the
terrorists, thus undermine their political support. 7 I contend that the way in which the
government has dealt with its political opponents and critics is a vital element of its legal
strategies and antiterrorism practices. Unlike many jurisdictions, the Jordanian debate involves a
different dimension; the decision to rely on law and legal procedures to reduce the coercive and
political capabilities of terrorists could provide a different overall pattern through introducing
institutional changes in the realm of political repression and social control. Such an approach
runs through the risk of being directed at those who may share the terrorists’ political goals,
though not their means, but because they do not operate secretly are easier targets for the state.

6
7

See, part [III] of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion of these developments.
Martha Crenshaw, Paper presented to the American Political Science Association: How Terrorism Ends (1987).
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Thus, the discussion of Jordan’s approach to counterterrorism would focus on the balance
between combating a religious radical ideology that uses instrumental political goals to attract
recruits, radicalize a population, and marginalizing political dissent without turning it into a
radical opposition movement that would raise public sympathy, stimulate religious indoctrination
and use of violence.

B. Jordan’s response to terrorism
What makes a response option have a distinct approach?
Almost each country that in one way or another has experienced terrorist incidents has adopted
some measures in order to accommodate its legislation to the specific features of terrorists’
objectives and rekindle means of combat. The considerable degree to which it has been possible
to respect the principles of law and legal guarantees of the constitutional system can be both
surprising and alarming. In some countries, even those with well-established democratic
traditions, governments have made ample recourse, if only for limited periods of time and
against certain individuals, to extraordinary measures. According to scholars; with states of
emergency and exceptions to rule of law becoming more common in established democracies,
the distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes starts to blur. 8 Indeed, measures
that include prolonged detentions, coercive interrogations of suspected terrorists, and military
orders do not necessarily reflect an individualistic culture different from responses that are a
typical feat of authoritarian regimes found in the east and the south. Yet, what makes one
response distinct from another is the latent purpose behind use of the full force of law; the

8

GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005).
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relationship between the legal system and its application, especially where the government is
dealing with domestic groups.

In his book Political Injustice, 9 Anthony Pereira argues against what most studies assume that
regimes that come to power by force or through unconstitutional manner cannot rely on law to
maintain control of society or legitimize their continuity. He states that authoritarian regimes use
the law to bolster their rule all the time; in particular many of them resort to court system and
procedures to wipe their political opponents. However, it should not be assumed that all
authoritarian regimes are similar in nature; different types of authoritarian regimes face different
propensities to survive and develop towards democracy.

A study by Hadenius and Teorell demonstrates that various types of authoritarian regimes have
different likelihoods of breaking down and being transformed into democracy. 10 The most
durable regimes are either highly authoritarian or strongly democratic. The latter had a life span
of 17.5 years (during the period of their investigation 1972-2003) against 25.4 years for
monarchies. Given the patterns of change, traditional monarchies - the most stable and resilient
to change - most often change into either non-party (party-less elections), or multiparty system
within the monarchical framework. Among study conclusions; an authoritarian multiparty
regime of the traditional kind is the typical stepping stone to a complete democratization. Jordan
being a monarchical type of regime characterized by having multiparty system, while not being a
full-fledged democracy is a very important designation that the below discussion shall draw
upon.
9

ANTHONY PEREIRA, POLITICAL INJUSTICE, 5, (Pittsburgh Press 2005).
Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to Democracy (1972–
2003), 9-16 (University of Notre Dame, Working Paper No. 331, 2006).

10
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The timeframe of the below discussion is divided in three; pre-September 11, 2001 years (19682001), post-September 11, 2001 and pre-November 11, 2005 period, and post-November 9, 2005
years (2005-2008). Throughout the periods in question, Jordan’s approach has not drastically
changed. These periods continue to share common characteristics; however, there exist some
distinct differences that following text aims to highlight.

1. Pre-9/11: a brief overview
Jordan’s approach to counterterrorism has evolved in response to both international and domestic
incidents. Since the previously analyzed statistical data go back to 1968, the period examined
starts in that year. Having established this cutoff point, we proceed into the classification of
response options during a three-decade period. The widely used classification is the one that
distinguishes between two types of response; conciliatory and repressive responses. There are
two common forms of a conciliatory response; accommodation, which includes negotiating and
possibly giving in to specific terrorists’ demands, and reform by usually addressing the
grievances without having to deal directly with terrorists. As for repressive responses, as
mentioned in the introductory, its two basic forms; the legal repressive or criminal justice model
in which counterterrorism adheres to criminal prosecution and punishment within the rule of law
as terrorism is an established crime, and the war model that favors military solutions. However,
the criminal justice and war model represent a coercive approach to countering terrorism; both
are associated with the use of force – by police or military forces - in which serious departures
from conventional criminal and judicial processing could be observed. In this respect, the

14

unanswered question remains; what level of force is appropriate and whether excessive use of
force can ever be acceptable?

From the late 1960s until the mid-1980s, separatists, socialist groups and nationalist; particularly
leftist Palestinian nationalist groups, were dealt with primarily by means of repression, namely
the military model. In 1967, after the Arab-Israeli war, emergency powers were adopted
countrywide to deal with the terrorist threat and in response to Black September violence 11 that
was considered a serious existential danger to the regime. With the Black September, however, it
can be argued that the government, incensed by the affront to its sovereignty, adopted a more
violent approach, relying on army raid that ended in the expulsion of the entire guerrilla
organization out of Jordan rather than their arrest.

In the late 1980s, the military model continued to predominate in the domestic context, though
left-wing revolutionaries no longer posed a direct terrorist threat. In the wake of the 1989 riots in
the southern part of the country, the military model as a counterterrorism discourse was
expanded to confront domestic violent opposition. This specific incident marked the largest-scale
armed fighting between government troops and domestic groups since the Black September
military clashes in the 1970s.

11

The period after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war had witnessed an upsurge in the power of Palestinian resistance
elements in Jordan. It was in September 1970 that open fighting erupted between the military and Palestinian
guerrilla organizations fida’yeen in what came to be known as “Black September.” This civil war culminated, after
several broken agreements, with at least 3500 killed on all sides, and led to the expulsion of the fida’yeen from the
kingdom to its new bases in Lebanon. For further analysis of the 1970 event see, ADNAN ABU-ODEH,
JORDANIANS, PALESTINIANS AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, 30 (The Endowment of the
United States Institute of Peace 1999), and DAVID RAAB, TERROR IN BLACK SEPTEMBER (Palgrave
Macmillan 2007).

15

As early as 1990, the government announced the end of the state of emergency that had been in
effect since 1967, and with that it abandoned the military model for the criminal justice model
i.e. criminal system, in its handling both terrorism and opposition. At the time, the military
model had begun to gain considerable prominence in western approaches to counterterrorism
with the emergence of Islamic radical groups throughout the Middle East, and elsewhere.
Nonetheless, the government had no official antiterrorist policy distinct from ordinary criminal
justice policy. It regarded terrorism as a crime, and decided to deal with terrorists within the ‘rule
of law.’ However, one consequence of this approach had been a trend toward the militarization
of the police within the criminal justice model. One manifestation of this has been through the
dispatch of Special Forces 12 to areas where domestic threat of use of violence against the
government is perceived to be severe. 13 Such forces are mandated to use force for what might
otherwise be normal police work. The prevalent solution in incidents of violent opposition has
been the use of local police, with the assistance of Special Forces units, for the apprehension of
suspects, searches and seizures, thus terminating such incidents by means of assault.

During the 1990s, granting amnesties appeared to be a proven recourse for dealing with radical
Islamists and other government’s opponents. As part of a conciliatory approach to try to deal
with some of the grievances professed by terrorists, the government seemed to make use of royal
amnesties both as a deterrent message and as means of alleviating political tension. In its history,
Jordan witnessed far more unlikely amnesties that had proved to be successful in bringing back

12

The “Royal Special Forces” is a unit within the Armed Forces of Jordan. It is directly connected to the king. In
fact, the current monarch was the Commander of the unit up until he assumed the throne. Its personnel are equipped
with the most sophisticated military equipment, and receive special military training. In 2007, Jordan hired the
services of Blackwater Worldwide to train the unit.
13
For background on the 1996 protests, see Lamis Andoni and Jillian Schwedler, Bread Riots in Jordan, 201 Middle
East Report Online, (1996).
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terrorists and government’s opponents into conventional politics.14 While this worked in the
past, it can also backfire as in the case of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who was granted such an
amnesty by the government in 1999. In this case, the terrorist violence came back much stronger
and on a larger scale than before, with a move from bombing to suicide bombing.

2. Post - September 11, 2001 and Pre – November 9, 2005
Some observers point to the events of September 11, 2001, as justification for authoritarian
regimes to put political freedoms on hold while cooperating with the United States and its
western allies in the “war on terror.” Christopher Harding was quoted as saying that it is ‘in the
interest of governments to take advantage of any opportunities for extending the scope of their
measures of legal control when political circumstances are conducive to such developments.’ 15

At a first glance, Jordan’s legislative response to 9/11 seems no different than those of the
Anglo-American systems. Like several jurisdictions, and in compliance with its obligations
under international law, some significant amendments to the Penal Code were enacted, mainly;
the expansion of the definition of terrorism, the introduction of new offences, particularly
criminalizing terrorist financing, and the extensive application of penalties, including death
penalty in the manner explored earlier. 16 Thus, along with the introduction of these amendments
to the Penal Code, the legislation went beyond antiterrorism provisions to impose new legal

14

In 1957, the chief-of-staff of the Jordanian Army, Ali Abu Nuwar, led a failed military coupé against King
Hussein. Not only was he not executed, he was pardoned and allowed to return to Jordan from exile in Egypt.
General Ali Khairi, Abu Nuwar’s deputy and conspirator was also pardoned and allowed to live in Jordan. Similarly,
Nathir Rashid, a free officer who has also conspired to fell the regime, was granted amnesty and was later appointed
as Minister of Interior Affairs. See, NACHMAN TAL, RADICAL ISLAM: IN EGYPT AND JORDAN, 221
(Sussex Academic Press 2005).
15
Christopher Harding, International Terrorism: The British Response, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 18
(2002), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=426921
16
Part [II] infra.
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restrictions that ultimately tighten control on political dissent, in particular, non-violent critics
such as journalists and newspaper editors. This indiscriminate labeling is considered by some
scholars as one of the most anti-democratic symptoms of an endangered state that confuses
which violence is an action and which is a reaction. 17 Perhaps one of the key objectives of
terrorists is to provoke states into adopting security policies that expose the limits of the rule of
law and undermines the normal authority of the state. Yet, by failing to distinguish between
political actors who avoid the use of violence and rely on democratic means, and those who use
violence as a first resort or as a provocative method, the government may fall for the terrorist
strategy.

The legal context of this discussion is Article 150, which on an initial reading, explicitly
prohibits acts that result in or instigate racial, religious or sectarian bias; ultimately creating a
climate of incitement to use violence. 18 Although the amendments introduced by Temporary
Law no. 54 of 2001 were later repealed, yet such response reflects government’s approach to use
antiterrorism legislation against mere political opponents, thus equating between political
expression, as a civil right, and incitement to political dissent and sedition; a recognized crime
under international and national laws, for this purpose.

17

RONALD CRELINSTEN AND ALEX SCHMID, Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance
Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 324 (Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid eds., Frank Cass
Publishers 1993).
18
It is not the subject matter of this paper to discuss the validity of Article 150 of the Penal Code. However, this
article falls under what is widely recognized as ‘hate speech law.’ The debate in Jordan regarding measures against
the abuse of freedom of speech and association to incite because of racial, religious or political motives is neither
new nor different from worldwide controversy, especially in democratic societies, surrounding the respect for
human rights. Hate speech and incitement are prohibited by international human rights law i.e. Article (4) of the
1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Jordan is party to.
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The aforementioned temporary law amended Article 150 of the original 1960 text punishing for
‘every writing, speech and act intended to or resulting in the provocation of sectarian and or
racial chauvinism or urging discord between the sects and different elements of the nation’ by a
prison sentence of six months to three years plus a fine of 50 dinars (US$70), to the following:

Regardless of any other law, a prison sentence shall be imposed for any
writing, speech or any act broadcast by whatever means, or publication of
news in press or any publication, where such is of a nature to injure
national unity or to incite commission of crimes or spread rancor and
hatred and discord between individuals of the society or provoke racial or
sectarian chauvinism, or injure the dignity, personal freedoms and
reputation of individuals, or shake the basic foundations of society by
promoting deviant behavior or immorality or by publishing false
information or rumors or incitement to agitation or vigils or the holding of
public meetings in a manner contravening the applicable law, or by any
act liable to undermine the prestige, reputation or dignity of the state.

A second paragraph was added to the above amended article providing for the punishment of the
editor-in-chief and owner of any publication used in such an act, in addition to temporary or
permanent closure of the newspapers or press ‘in accordance with a decision of the court.’ This
paragraph became the focus of criticisms soon after an editor-in-chief of a political weekly was
charged with ‘writing and publishing false information and rumors that may harm the prestige
and reputation of the state and slander the integrity and reputation of its members’ after

19

publishing a critical article of the government. The constitutionality of this paragraph was
challenged in court by a number of newspapers editors and owners, in addition to the Jordanian
Press Association, but the court rejected the case based on lack of interest of the petitioners. 19
Under intense pressure from human rights groups, and criticism of the sweeping terms of this
provision, the government issued in 2003 another temporary law, 20 in which Article 150 was
changed back to its original reading: ‘every writing, speech and act intended to or resulting in
the provocation of sectarian and or racial chauvinism or urging discord between the sects and
different elements of the nation shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to three years
and a fine of 50 [Jordanian] dinars.’

Practically, changing the article to its supra original form did not much affect the government’s
approach in dealing with political expression in the context of combating terrorist threat. 21 In
2004, the same aforementioned editor-in-chief of the political weekly was remanded in custody
for two weeks, in addition to its suspension, for writing an editorial deemed to harm Jordan’s
foreign relations. 22 Further, the government has extended the application of Article 150 to
material posted on the internet. In 2007, a former parliamentarian 23 was sentenced to two years
in prison for ‘attacking the state’s prestige and reputation’ by posting an open letter on the

19

See, discussion in Part [V] on the mechanism of challenging the constitutionality of legislation.
Temporary Law No. 45 of 2003 amending the Penal Code.
21
The International Press Institute through its annual report “World Press Freedom Review,” monitors media
activities and documents threats to press freedom around the world. The 2001-2007 Jordan: World Press Review
provides a comprehensive narrative of the events in which press freedom violations were committed by the
government during the given period. Available at: http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom.html, last visited
October 8, 2008.
22
On 9 May 2004, State Prosecutor ordered Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of the political weekly “Al-Majd,” to be
remanded in custody for two weeks for writing an editorial allegedly harming ties with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. The editorial, headlined “Cowardice Is Guideline for Policies,” reportedly accused the Saudi authorities of
being the “lackeys” of the United States. On 10 May, the State Prosecutor also ordered the suspension of “Al-Majd.”
INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM REVIEW: JORDAN (2004).
23
Ahmad Abbadi, a member of parliament from 1989 to 1993 and from 1997 to 2001, is head of the Jordan National
Movement, a party not recognized by the government. See, http://www.jordannationalmovement.com/
20

20

internet to United States Senator Harry Reid in which he accused the government of
corruption. 24

Another noteworthy change made by the temporary law of 2001, which was kept in the law
promulgated by parliament in 2007, is the amendment to Article 195 of the Penal Code. This
article falls under a heading titled ‘Slander, Libel and Defamation” crimes within the chapter on
‘Crimes against Public Administration.’ In the original 1960 text, Article 195 prohibited lèse
majesté – an offense against the dignity of the monarch. According to a study done by the World
Press Freedom Committee, 25 few countries still prosecute against this crime. In Jordan, it is illegal

to mock or criticize the King, and doing so can provoke a sentence up to three years in prison. 26
However, the amendment inter alia added a new clause to the list of the offences that constitute
the crime of lèse majesté; making it more restrictive, it states:

d) Whosoever gossips about His Majesty the King or commits calumny by
attributing to him words or deed which the King did not say or do, or
acting to broadcast such or spread it among people.

The aforementioned study makes clear that lèse majesté prosecutions are fundamentally political.
It concludes that such laws are often used by states to punish expression it finds offensive and
insulting. Where the defendants are overwhelmingly editorial critics of the regime, dissenters, or

24

HUMANT RIGHTS WATCH, JORDAN: RELEASE CRITIC CHARGED WITH SLANDER: AUTHORITIES
MUZZLING OPPONENTS DESPITE NEW LAW (2007), available at: http://hrw.org.
25
IT’S A CRIME: HOW TO INSULT LAWS STIFLE PRESS FREEDOM, 11 (Marilyn Greene ed., World Press
Freedom Committee 2006).
26
See, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STATE INJUSTICE: UNFAIR TRIALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA (1998).
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activists in an opposition party, the law becomes a convenient tool to deploy vigorously against
government’s adversaries in politics and journalism. In recent years, several charges were
brought against regime critics. One of the most prominent cases that attracted much media
attention was the charges brought against Adnan Abu-Odeh, a former head of the Royal Court
for remarks he made during an interview broadcasted on Al-Jazeera satellite television.
Government prosecutors had determined that Abu-Odeh’s remarks could qualify as ‘stirring up
sectarian strife or sedition among the nation’ and lèse majesté under articles 150 and 195 of the
penal code, respectively. Nevertheless, the charges were later dropped; a move described by
human rights groups as a “tactic” of intimidating political opponents, 27 and to lessen
international attention to Jordan’s “retreat from democratization.” 28

Charges brought under articles 150 and 195, are to be tried before the State Security Court, rather
than civil courts. 29 However, this is neither new to the criminal justice system nor related to the
9/11 attacks. The State Security Court was first established in 1952 by constitutional authority as
a special court assigned jurisdiction over civilian perpetrators accused of offences against state
security. 30 In principle, the court is composed of a three-judge panel of either military “and/or”
civilian judges, 31 yet it has always been formed of a military majority. Between 1967 and 1990,

27

Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch said: “This
apparent tactic of initiating and later dropping charges has a chilling effect on regime critics,” available at:
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/07/jordan14529.htm
28
Jillian Schwedler, Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing, 5, Middle East Report Online (2002),
available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070302.html
29
Civil Courts handles civil liability that arises from violations to Press and Publications Law no. 8 of 1998, as
amended in 1999 and 2007. The law imposes financial penalties (i.e. fine) for any violation to the provisions of the
law. Fines for defamation, libel, insult to religious beliefs or publication of material that fuel sectarianism or racism
reaches up to US$28,000. See, Article 38(d) and Article 46(d) of the Law. However, any act that potentially
threatens the integrity of the state is prosecutable under the penalties of the penal code.
30
Law no. 7 of 1952. This law was later annulled by State Security Court Law no. 17 of 1959, which apparently
named the special court ‘State Security Court,’ giving it a permanent status, and outlined its jurisdiction and
authorities in further detail.
31
Article 2 of Law no. 71 of 1959.
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the martial law era, it was replaced by a military martial court system, and was reintroduced in
1991. In August 2001, there had been an amendment through a temporary law 32 to the legislation
establishing the State Security Court. The amendment inter alia restricted the right of appeal to
those convicted of ‘felon’ in the State Security Court. 33 What does that involve? Acts committed
in violation to article 150 and 195 qualify as ‘misdemeanor’ 34 and according to the State Security
Court law, those convicted do not have the right to appeal the sentence before Court of
Cassation. The amendment created enormous concern among human rights and freedom of
expression groups because of potential implications of its misuse to quell political dissent,
whether expressed in newspapers, through political parties, in demonstrations and rallies, or
through legal civil society organizations.35 The case of Toujan Faisal cuts to the heart of the
matter by exposing a much larger problem of severe restrictions on political expression and civil
rights. Faisal, a liberal from a Caucasian origin and Jordan’s first elected female deputy (19931997), was sentenced in 2002 by the State Security Court for 18 months imprisonment for
“seditious libel” and “spreading information deemed harmful to the reputation of the state.” This
came after Faisal did an interview with Al-Jazeera television channel and published an open
letter on the online newspaper, Arab Times, 36 in which she accused the government of

32

Temporary Law no. 44 of 28 August of 2001. In accordance with the Constitution, the law was submitted for
parliamentary scrutiny and review, wherein it was approved after introducing some amendments, and promulgated
by Law no. 22 of 2004.
33
In accordance with the Constitution, this Temporary Law was submitted for parliamentary scrutiny and review,
wherein it was approved after repealing the 2001 controversial amendment that denied individuals convicted of
‘misdemeanor’ the right to appeal before the Court of Cassation. The law was promulgated by Law no. 22 of 2004.
34
Article (21) of Penal Code states that the penalty imprisonment for a misdemeanor ranges between a week and a
three-year.
35
In June 2002, the Jordanian Bar Association held a one-week boycott from appearing before the Court in protest
of the amendment to the State Security Court Law eliminating this right of appeal. See, LYNN WELCHMAN, AntiTerrorism Law and Policy in Arab States, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, 600 (Victor
Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach eds., Cambridge University Press 2005).
36
Until 2001, Jordan was considered a country with a relatively open internet service. However, since then, the
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through laws threatening freedom of expression in the media, including the Internet. Hence, all ISPs were
technically forced to pass through a state company to access the Internet, which meant all online messages were
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corruption. 37 Faisal’s lawyer were unsuccessful in contesting the constitutionality of supra
temporary law that made appeal in her case impossible. Nevertheless, she was granted a ‘special’
royal amnesty based on “humanitarian grounds” that released her from prison before completing
her sentence, thus kept her criminal conviction. According to Jordanian laws, individuals
convicted of non-political crimes such as crimes against public morality and order are unfit to
practice certain professions or run for public office. 38

It is often said that the choice of basic approach to counterterrorism is important. Thus,
fundamental to any research concerning terrorism is a definition, especially when looking at the
law. Why? There is a general belief that in order to combat a monster, one needs to understand its
nature and modus operandi. A workable definition that describes the main characteristics of
terrorism is seen necessary to devise domestic security policies and make certain solutions
thinkable within that particular framework. Based on the above discussion, it is clear that
Jordan’s approach to counterterrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 fails to follow suit. It is
very difficult to reach any cogent analysis of Jordan’s counterterrorism policy by linking
between text definition of terrorism and the legal framework developed to deal with. Yet, what if
the conventional discussion of construing a policy by looking at a definition is turned around?
Theoretically speaking, can we attempt to enunciate a definition of terrorism from the approach
used by Jordan?

monitored by the government. Some of the websites blocked were, www.arabtimes.com, www.arabmail.de and
www.ammannet.net. For further discussion, see source cited supra note 22.
37
Faisal was detained in March 2002 after accusing the then prime minister, in an open letter to the government
published online on the Arab Times newspaper, of “benefiting personally” from a government decision to double car
insurance premiums, in one of a series of temporary laws called “essential’ to the country's security. Wasn't it
curious, she asked, that Abu Ragheb's [Prime Minister] family dominates the car insurance industry in Jordan? See
supra note 28 at 1.
38
For example, see Article 3(c)(2) of the Elections Law, Temporary Law no. 34 of 2001.
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A paper by Jeff Goodwin offers a socio-scientific theory of terrorism that emphasizes on the
strategic choice of terrorism by social movements. He suggests a theory of “categorical
terrorism,” in which terrorism is directed against anonymous individuals by virtue of their
belonging to a specific ethnic, religious, national or social group. He emphasizes that groups that
employ this type of terrorism are oppositional political groups, which views terrorism as a
political strategy. In recent years, it has been employed by radical Islamist groups. Goodwin
defines categorical terrorism as “the strategic use of violence and threats of violence, usually
intended to influence several audiences, by oppositional political groups against civilians or
noncombatants who belong to a specific ethnicity, religious or national group, social class or
some other collectivity, without regard to their individual identities or roles.” 39

Given the perceived threat of radical elements within the country’s Islamic movement and their
potential use of violence in order to change the political, and perhaps the socioeconomic, order in
more or less fundamental ways; Goodwin’s aphorism about categorical terrorism explains –
better than extant definition - Jordan’s decision to use counterterrorism law and legal procedures
in dealing with political opponents who may or may not, employ a strategy characterized by the
use of violence against civilians. Although Goodwin admits that his theory requires more
rigorous empirical testing, however, the definition offered is entirely in tandem with Jordan’s
emergent counterterrorism approach. This perception of terrorism suggests that the choice of
counterterrorism approach is in large part of how opponents perceive their government. This
deduction not only shows a difference in the overall pattern of political repression, but also a
distinctive approach to counterterrorism.
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25

The period that followed the United States attack on Iraq in 2003, indicated the government’s
inclination toward adopting a different approach in dealing with political dissent and the issue of
terrorism alike. It witnessed some kind of metamorphic change from mere political
repressiveness into counter-ideological approach that targeted Islamic activism. Following the
end of the Iraq war in April 2003, the number of Islamists detained on suspicion of belonging to
Al-Qaeda witnessed a steep increase in terrorism-related arrests. According to Amnesty
International’s Jordan Country Report, the numbers climbed from 50 in 2001 40 into hundreds in
the period between the years 2003 - 2005. 41 A constellation of favorable circumstances might
have triggered this refocus. The rising tide of radical Islamist groups associated with the
unparalleled level and sophistication of violence; primarily in Iraq and the Palestinian occupied
territories required a careful look at the potential threat of radical Islamists. In addition, the
release of the 9/11 Commission final report that summoned up the United States, and the West’s,
growing realization 42 that the enemy is one that goes beyond a finite group of people i.e. AlQaeda, to include a radical ideological movement was certainly encouraging to prove to the
West, in particular the United States, that Jordan is a proactive and reliable ally against terror in
the region.
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Yet, in an attempt to diffuse public pressure owing to mass opposition to the Iraq war and
government’s overall pro-western policies; Jordan set a new tone that seemed to characterize its
future approach to counterterrorism. In 2004, King Abdullah II issued a statement called the
Amman Message [“the Message”] calling for tolerance and unity in the Islamic world. 43 On the
outset, it was an ideological counter-message or some form of a sophisticated attack on the
distortion of Islam being made by Bin-Laden and his followers; however, it also revealed a new
course in dealing with political opponents, one that is primarily focused on the Islamist
movement opposition, its foreign allegiance, and essentially, its role in provoking a radical
political opposition to achieve its political goals. The Message attempted to address the methods
and means in which radical Islamic groups utilize to attract recruits and influence radicalism in
matters of religious interpretation. Most importantly, it placed parameters for the issuance of
religious edicts fatwas which radical Islamists use as a vehicle to spread their ideology, including
the takfiri ideology i.e. to declare a person an apostate. In the immediate term, the Message was a
benign effort to counteract and reduce the political credibility of radical Islamists. Thus, it lacked
the legal framework or teeth to delegitimize such acts by making it a crime punishable under the
law.

And in 2006, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leadership, 44 in a tactical move, affirmed its
adherence to the fundamentals of the Message, and its rejection “to terrorism in all its forms.” 45
It has also received exceptional media attention and was praised by world western leaders. 46
43

The official website for the Amman Message is available at: http://www.ammanmessage.com
The Message was endorsed in July 2005 Islamic Convention by religious leaders representing the eight Islamic
schools of jurisprudence.
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Declaration issued by the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan, July 2006, available at:
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However, it failed to resonate with significant audiences, including Jordanians for two main
reasons: a) it was a top-down initiative 47

issued by pro-western monarch, who is seen as

someone who does not have enough credibility as a religious figure in the Islamic world to
deliver this counter-message. 48 Jordan’s close alliance with America has weighed down such
initiative to a mere United States propaganda; b) the inner circle of Al-Qaeda and its dedicated
cadres who make up the ranks of affiliated terrorist groups have proved to be almost immune to
counter-ideological messages, on the contrary, such messages might be viewed as provocative by
radicals.

3. Post – November 9, 2005 [“11/9”] 49
11/9 marks a no less significant date to Jordanians than 9/11 is to Americans. Not only the
country experienced the deadliest attacks in its history, it has instigated an important shift in the
Jordanian legal culture. The suicide attacks were perpetrated by Iraqis who were enraged by the
war in their country, and chose a close American ally as a target for their revenge. Yet, they were
masterminded by a Jordanian; Al-Zarqawi, who at that time elicited high levels of domestic
sympathy as a Jordanian hero who gave voice to hostilities toward the United States. Al-Zarqawi
had relied in past attempts on Jordanians for domestic attacks, but his decision to recruit non-
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King Abdullah implicitly acknowledged this in a speech in Washington D.C. in September 2005 in which he
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Jordanians in this specific incident was seen as a tactical move in which he exploited a key
intelligence weakness in detecting foreign elements. 50

Nevertheless, the government reasonably understood that while the attacks might have temporary
lessened support to Al-Zarqawi, 51 many Jordanians, who share same religious ideology, 52 might
still sympathize and even accept similar future attacks aimed at government institutions, United
States and Israeli targets, and Western civilians. The regime became particularly concerned with
managing its Islamic opposition not only as a potential challenge to its power and legitimacy, but
as a group vulnerable to the influence of radical Islamists, inside and across its borders, who
would exploit the Islamic opposition’s dissatisfaction with the government to radicalize its
institutions that would nurture, harbor and support terrorists.

The attacks gave the regime the leverage to announce its new counter-ideological approach that
in essence builds on its earlier effort; the Message, and develops it into a legal and regulatory
framework designed to stop further radicalization and new recruits. As articulated by the words
of the king; the 11/9 attacks “affirm the extent of our need to adopt a comprehensive strategy to
confront takfiri culture. Such a strategy does not envision security solutions alone, but also takes
into account the intellectual, cultural and political dimensions of standing up to those who are
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charting paths of destruction and sabotage to realize their aims.” 53 In this context, a word of
warning was sent to the media to take responsibility in promoting tolerance and fighting the
radical ideology “in a way that is consistent with Jordan’s interests.” 54 As an incentive, the
government promised amendments to media laws as part of an overall reform process to
minimize state interference in the press and ease some of the restriction on journalists to freely
carry out their work. Hence, article 42(2) of the Press and Publications Law no. 8 of 1998 was
amended by adding a provision: “Detention as a result of enunciation of an opinion in speech,
writing or through other means of expression is not allowed.” At the same time, other tenets of
the penal code were amended to allow increased fines for defamation, libel, insult to religious
beliefs or publication of material that fuels sectarianism or racism. 55

Overall, the government did not abandon its previous approach that was influenced by its
determination to marginalize political dissent, hence the heightened use of restrictive legal
measures to curb political expression. Yet, following the 11/9 event, it was established that the
forthcoming period would be about discouraging sympathizers among Islamic opposition per se
from supporting radical adversaries, and reduce the number of potential new recruits for radical
groups. According to the declaration of Marouf Bakhit – appointed Prime Minister following the
11/9 attacks – to the parliament: ‘the suicide bombers made us more determined to move forward
in our pre-emptive war against terrorism and the ‘takfiri’ culture,’ and that his cabinet is
determined to fight Islamic extremists.56 One might question if there was a parallel strategy
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devised to deal with the threat of non-Jordanian terrorists other than measures taken to increase
intelligence powers. Though it seems illogical to separate between Jordanian and non-Jordanians
in terms of terrorism and counterterrorism, thus this paper strives to stay focused on the domestic
aspect of the threat and the approach taken as a result.

The legal framework developed here could be applied to three main issues. The first concerns
dissuading radicals from attacking Jordan by enacting a special anti-terror legislation to
supplement the provisions of the Penal Code. In other words, the assumption is to match “terror”
with “legal terror” to deter Islamic opponents who think of using violence as a means of Islamic
activism from committing such acts. The second issue concerns limiting religious space by
controlling sources of radicalization or (physical environment) that radicals would use to
influence their target audience. A Rand Corporation research identified three nodes or physical
venues for radicalization: radicalized mosques, educational establishments and prisons. 57 Thus,
focus is turned to the question about preventing radicals from spreading their ideology via
religious services or places of worship. The last issue concerns the management of collective
action through controlling platforms that expose mainstream moderate Islamists to those who
may offer them alternative ideologies and alternative courses of action, including violence. The
assumption here is that a state through social control manages to keep Islamic activism under
surveillance.
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a. Prevention through Legal Deterrence: Prevention of Terrorism Law [“PTL”]
Formulating an appropriate legal response to terrorism, in general, presents governments
with a political dilemma. Political and security theorists suggest that by failing to act
decisively, a government runs the risk of providing terrorists with the opportunity to
realign in a manner that would allow for further and even more devastating attacks.
Equally, there is the normative danger of over-reacting. A spate of new antiterrorism laws
enacted following a high-profile attack often features enhanced penalties for acts defined
as terrorism. In many jurisdictions it introduces extraordinary powers that could spread to
other parts of the criminal law. 58

Thus, the enactment of new criminal laws is seen to have different implications. Victor
Ramraj talks about what criminologists refer to as ‘govern[ing] through crime’ and states’
tendency to rely on the law as the solution to distress a terror event. 59 Laura Donohue
suggests that some counterterrorism measures impose fear and violence without regard to
guilt or innocence in order to impress a larger audience.60 Kent Roach argues that the
enactment of new criminal laws after acts of terrorism implies that the existing criminal
law was inadequate to respond to acts of terrorism, thus deter radicals from committing
future attacks. 61 Though, he claims that the accuracy of such an argument depends on the
baseline established by the ordinary criminal law in each particular jurisdiction. 62 For
instance, in Jordan’s jurisdiction, in addition to having a ‘terrorism’ crime long before
58
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9/11, other ordinary crimes with respect to attempts, conspiracy and accomplice liability
for crimes such as murder and bombings could already be applied to terrorists. In
addition, tough penalties i.e. death penalty are already employed for such serious acts.

One way of determining the instrumental value of a new counterterrorism law in
preventing terrorism is to examine the criminal law that existed before a successful terror
attack triggered such response. As illustrated in following sections, in the aftermath of
9/11, criminal law reform in Jordan was part of the worldwide expansion of criminal laws
facilitated by UNSC Resolution 1373 that was enacted under mandatory Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. The resolution instigated the pattern of reactive reform by calling on all
countries to ensure that terrorist acts, including the financing of terrorism, ‘are
established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts.’ To a certain extent,
Jordan seems to have taken the UNSC resolution provisions as a deadline for enacting
new counterterrorism laws, and as an opportunity to pledge its strong support for the
United States in its ‘war on terror.’ Probably with the exception of the new laws against
the financing of terrorism, 63 the introduced criminal law amendments were largely
offered as a symbolic response to 9/11 without fully understanding the dimensions of
deterrence.

63

Although they were featured in the UNSC resolution 1373 and reflected in new criminal law amendments and
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Nevertheless, one week after the Amman bombings killed sixty people and wounded
around hundred others on November 9, 2005, the government proposed a new bill as an
emergency measure that, in principle, was to include both punitive and self-protective
measures for the state and individuals, respectively. It was not until November 2006 that
the law went into effect after being promulgated by parliament and published in the
Official Gazette. 64 As its title indicates, the legislation’s main objective is to stop future
attacks from taking place. Before, the authorities relied on the country’s Penal Code to
deal with terrorism-related issues, whether to punish for committed acts, or to deter
through the imposition of punishment or by increasing already existing penalties.

Normally instant new criminal laws in the wake of terrible terrorist attacks rely on
broader and tougher offences to punish and prevent acts of terrorism. In the American
context, the Patriot Act, 65 incorporated new criminal offenses in a manner that asserts
Professor Roach’s claim and demonstrate the belief that broadening and toughening the
criminal law will deter future acts of terrorism. The crime of providing material support
for terrorism, which was first created in 1996 in the wake of Oklahoma City bombings, is
one example of a crime that was broadened to include the provision of monetary
instruments and ‘expert advice and assistance’ to terrorist groups. 66 The maximum
penalty for this offence was increased from ten to fifteen years with the possibility of life
imprisonment if it involves taking a human life. 67
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Discussions dealing with the deterrent value of higher and harsher penalties normally
differentiate between terrorists and third parties who may provide support to terrorists.
Seemingly, the severity of punishment is likely to have a marginal impact on terrorists; 68
a suicide bomber planning a terror attack must know that he will be facing relatively high
maximum penalties. Further, foreign terrorists such as the Iraqis who perpetrated the 11/9
attacks will most likely be unfamiliar with the relevant penalties for the crime they plan
to commit or basically indifferent about anything besides furthering their cause.
However, third party terrorists who facilitate or provide assistance may be more
amenable than terrorists to deterrence. Professor Alan Dershowitz attributes that to the
calculated and political nature of terrorism. 69 He has proposed deterrence strategies that
depend in part on collective punishment. 70 Although he admits that this might be ‘the
most immoral technique for combating terrorism’ 71 in which people suffer harm and
stigma because of suspicions that they are terrorists, yet he concludes that ‘any effective
attack calculated to reduce terrorism must include an element of collective responsibility
and punishment for those supporting terrorism.’ 72 Although this argument is more of a
feature present in authoritarian regimes, yet it is apparent in the Patriot Act, which
captured its essence and established a separate section 73 that punishes with up to ten
years imprisonment ‘whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or he has
68
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reasonable grounds to believe, has committed or is about to commit’ a long list of
offences associated with terrorism. 74

However, similar to other regions’ immediate reactions, Jordan’s legislation stirred an
enormous amount of public debate among some lawmakers, human rights watchdog
groups and civilian society associations. Several human rights activists warned against
the legislation saying it would turn the country into a ‘police state’. Fifteen Islamic
Action Font lawmakers 75 denounced the law affirming that the PTL would encourage
terrorism because its “unjust clauses and sever punishments will oppress many people
and lead to the creation of more terror groups.” 76 Secretary General of the Jordanian
Muslim Brotherhood Jamil Abu Bakr said the law would “strengthen the grip of the
security forces and limit public freedoms.” 77 Leaders of other opposition groups and
professional associations accused the regime of nearing the completion of a full circle
back to martial rule, describing the law as “a blunt violation of the Constitutional and the
International Declaration of Human Rights.” 78 Amnesty International voiced similar
concerns calling upon the government ‘to repeal the legislation or amend it to bring it at
minimum in line with the obligations of Jordan under international law.’ 79

74

The Patriot Act ss. 803.
Fifteen out of the sixteen Islamist lawmakers who occupied House seats during the (2003-2007) parliament.
76
Jamal Halaby, Jordan parliament OKs terrorism law, 1, The Associated Press (August 2006).
77
CARNIGIE’S ARAB REFORM BULLETIN, JORDAN: GOVERNMENT APPROVES ANTI-TERRORISM
LAW (2006).
78
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN: ANTI-TERRORISM LAW CALLED MARTIAL, 1 (August
29, 2006).
79
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN’S ANTI-TERRORISM LAW OPENS DOOR TO NEW HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, 1, (2006), available at: www.amnestyusa.org
75

36

A significant question that lays siege to above concerns over the impact of the legislation
on public freedoms, mainly political expression, and the legal structure of the state: is
how effective was the enactment of that particular law in accomplishing the immediate
aim of the government i.e. deterrence value on radical Islamic elements. Yet, under such
circumstances, how is this measure evaluated in determining the effectiveness of the
regime’s overall strategy of marginalizing Islamic political opposition.

To probe the matter, the argument below is based on the two assumptions that dominate
the counterterrorism legal discourse: that existing criminal structure, as opposed to its
enforcement, was to blame for the failure to prevent terrorism. Thus, giving the
government the political legitimacy and obtaining the moral high ground to address this
inadequacy by enacting special counterterrorism legislation. The second is that
establishing collective responsibility and punishment for religious identification based on
radical ideology is necessary to deter future terrorist recruitment. Here, the principles of
individual responsibility and legality are stretched in a manner that provides the state
with an opportunity to exercise an important restraining influence on public dissent.

The first assumption will be addressed through shedding light on two terror incidents that
exemplifies the argument that the provisions of ordinary criminal law have been tough
enough to handle terrorism, and the emphasis on the criminal sanction and retributive
punishment do not necessarily create the desired level of deterrence. The first incident is
part of what the 9/11 Commission Report referred to as the ‘Millennium Crisis’. 80 It
involved the trial of a group of militant Jordanians of the ‘Hijazi cell’. Raed Hijazi, a dual
80
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national of Jordan and the United States, who in 2002 was sentenced to death 81 after
Jordanian intelligence services intercepted a telephone call that helped foil a plot to blow
up a fully booked, 400-room Jordanian hotel and two Christian tourist sites on the border
with Israel on the eve of the millennium in December 1999. Though this plot had been
implicated in the Bin Laden-linked Millennium plot in 1ate 1999, it is believed to be AlZarqawi’s first major attempt at a terrorist attack in Jordan. As a result, Al-Zarqawi was
convicted in absentia and sentenced to death by Jordan’s State Security Court for his
involvement. The terror attempt took place prior to 9/11 in which intelligence services
actions reflected vigilance and efficiency, and militants involved were referred to a state
security court for trial on counts of crimes pursuant to Jordan’s Penal Code. 82

The marginal deterrent value of new tougher criminal laws and harsher penalties becomes
apparent in the second incident. In December 2002, Jordanian authorities arrested two
men, a Libyan and a Jordanian, who later admitted to carrying out the assassination of
United States diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman in November 2002 after receiving
money from Al-Qaeda leader Al-Zarqawi. The two men had been charged with murder,
and sentenced to death by the military court. Six other men, including Al-Zarqawi, were
sentenced to death in absentia.
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Up until November 9, 2005, Jordan had been spared large scale terror attacks and suicide
bombings. According to remarks made by the king to the New York Times, Jordan’s
intelligence services had thwarted since April 2004 no less than 150 other terror attempts
by militant Islamists affiliated with Al-Qaeda. 83 Following 9/11, there has been
considerable increase in prosecutions and referrals to the State Security Court for acts
committed in violation of penal code that falls under its jurisdiction, in which death
penalty had been employed for conspiracy offences, attempted crime, as well as
committing the most serious acts of terrorism. As the Jordanian experience of subsequent
terror incidents demonstrate, security services, prosecutors and courts – notwithstanding
its controversy among human rights groups - have sufficient capabilities to investigate
apprehended acts of terrorism. Needless to say, this had not had any deterrent effect on
Al-Zarqawi, his followers and other radicals from attacking again.

However, from the above discussion flows the second interrelated assumption of this
argument. Jordan’s pledge to enact special counterterrorism legislation was part of an
immediate impetus to do something following the high-profile attacks. It worked as a
short-term measure to first; appease public anxiety by denouncing the terror acts and
expressing solidarity with the victims, and second; carry strong moral and religious
overtones. The state understood the political nature of the terror threat, and the danger of
radicals who move from rejecting the state’s legitimacy to advocating their ideologies
and attempting its violent overthrow. Thus, Jordan’s legislative response to the attacks
instituted the notion of collective responsibility based on ideological identification to
83
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influence public discourse through criminalizing, and seeking to punish those
ideologically supporting terrorism.

Indeed, apart from introducing the notion of collective responsibility for ideological
identification in the context of a terror crime, the PTL did not propose any amendments
in the realm of individual criminal responsibility and punishment to any of the relevant
criminal laws nor did it introduce extraordinary measures other than those already
existing under such laws. For instance, Article 8 gives the State Security Court
jurisdiction over terror crimes defined and identified by the law. It only makes sense to
re-establish the jurisdiction of the court over terror-related crimes if only the state’s
intention was to cover the notion of collective responsibility for ideological identification.
Why? Under article 4 of the State Security Court Law of 1959, the court is assigned broad
jurisdiction over individuals accused of offences - committed or attempted - against state
security, including aiders, abettors and accessories. There is no jurisdictional limitation
on extending collective responsibility based on mere ideological agreement that justifies
the use of violence. Hence, such court has fewer procedural judicial protections than
other ordinary courts since it has the discretion not to follow the regular Law of Criminal
Procedures 84 that sets the limits to rights and freedoms. However, this notion appears
implicit in the definition of terrorism. Article 2 states:

“Any intentional act committed by whichever means that leads to killing
or causing physical harm or inflicting damages to public or private
property or transportation or environment or infrastructure or
84

Law of Criminal Procedure no. 9 of 1961.
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international entities premises or diplomatic missions if the intention of
that action was to disturb public order and endanger public safety and
security or impede the implementation of the law or Constitution or to
influence state or government’s policy or force it to act or restrain or
endanger national security by fear or terror or violence.”

Ostensibly, the definition does not define terrorism as conduct or in criminal law terms
the actus reus or material element of the offence. Any intentional act covers ‘inchoate’
offences, where no result should necessarily occur. Thus, the act can vary between one
that causes death, serious injury or damage to property, to a less precise act such as the
one defined by Article 147 of the Penal Code which covers ‘violence’ or the ‘threat of
violence’, to engaging in certain political activity. 85 Nevertheless, the law does not
impose collective punishment or specify any penalty for any intentional act that qualifies,
according to the definition, as terrorism.

Article 3 prohibits in more general terms such acts of terrorism, thus, designates three
terrorism offences related to the formation, recruitment or membership in associations
that are not necessarily illegal or a terror group but may commit acts that could fall under
terrorism. In Jordan’s criminal system, establishing a ‘villains’ association or group is
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Article 147 of the Penal Code of 1960, as amended in 2001 and 2007, defines terrorism as follows: “Terrorism
shall mean the use of violence or threat of use thereof, whatever its motivations and purposes, occurring in
implementation of an individual or collective criminal plot aimed at disturbing public order or jeopardizing the
safety or security of society, where such is of a nature to spread fear among the people or frighten them or to expose
their lives and security to danger, or to cause damage to the environment, or to cause damage to, occupy or take
over public facilities and realty or private realty, international facilities and diplomatic missions, endangering
national resources or thwarting the provisions of the Constitution and laws.” For a detailed discussion on the
evolution and subsequent amendments on Article 147, see Part III of this dissertation under heading: The role of
United Nations measures against terrorism in developing the legal framework of Jordan’s response to terrorism.
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criminalized long before 11/9 or even 9/11. 86 Various forms of membership or
participation in an ‘illegal’ association or group may also be punished. 87 However, article
3(a) challenges a basic principle of criminal law i.e. the requirement for a clear illegal act
that is committed with fault. In essence, this provision introduced the concept of virtual
association based on sharing the political cause of terrorists that is essentially ideological
in nature, not on material support. It states:

‘Attempting by any means – direct or indirect – to provide or gather or
facilitate finances with the intention of using in committing terrorism
acts or knowing that it will be used entirely or partially, whether the
act was committed or not in the kingdom or against its citizens or
interests abroad.’

At a first glance, the above Article seems to be in conformity with the international legal
order. For instance, under Article 2(1) of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which Jordan has ratified in 2003, the
terrorist act need not be completed; the funds must have been collected in the knowledge
or with the intent that they should be used to commit a terrorist act. Also under Article
2(3), in order for an act to constitute an offence, the funds collected need not actually be
used to carry out a terrorist act; the fact that they were collected with the intent is
86

Article 157 of the Penal Code of 1960 criminalizes those who establish an association with the purpose of
committing felonies on people or property, and requires to be punished by imprisonment at hard labor. If the
criminals’ intent was to commit assault on human life, the punishment is not less than seven years of imprisonment
at hard labor.
87
Article 160 of the Penal Code punishes whoever becomes a member in an ‘illegal’ association that commits
seditious acts, vandalism or uses force and violence to topple the government by imprisonment at hard labor. Article
162 punishes those who donate, pay membership or provide assistance, or collects donations, membership
subscriptions or assistance by maximum imprisonment of six months.
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sufficient. However, given the political landscape when the law was considered and then
enacted; 88 the above provision goes beyond the particular issue of criminalizing the
financing of terrorism as actus reus, which the Penal Code and the terrorist financing
laws has dealt with. In practical terms, this article illustrates the collective responsibility
argument in which sharing the political cause of terrorists mens rea should be punished
for acts of terrorism because ‘the cause hopes and expects to benefit collectively from
terrorism,’ 89 whether the act was committed or not. Therefore, the focus on crime has led
to what is called the ‘criminalization of politics’, wherein the government could integrate
between political activism; mainly Islamic, and terrorism through the rubric of charitable
works. Though there is no concrete or detailed evidence that social welfare in Jordan is
central to radical Islamists’ ability to recruit, indoctrinate and fund terrorists, yet the
government is anticipating such a consequence based on the assumption that Islamic
social welfare organizations answer to the same political leaders who plays a hand-on
role in political dissent.

Moreover, Article 3(c) asserts the assumption that mere affiliation with a political or
social welfare group or organization or association, which could be a front organization
for terror acts, is invoked to classify such person as a terrorist without committing an act
of terror or a direct proof of intent: ‘forming whatever group or organization or
association or [being affiliated to] with the intention to commit terrorism acts in the
kingdom or against its citizens or interests abroad.’ Thus, the legislation provides
punishment of offenders for this ‘guilt by association’. Article 7(a) punishes for acts
88

The emergence of Hamas as a dominant political party and a ruling one in Cabinet in January 2006. See, Part [III]
of this dissertation.
89
See source cited supra note 71 at 174.
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listed under Article 3 by imprisonment at hard labor (between three and fifteen years)
provided no harsher penalty is imposed by another criminal law. 90

Article 4 provides law enforcement and intelligence with the legal teeth to expand the
scope of its powers to those who are suspected of their association with terrorism. The
Prosecutor General of the State Security Court,91 based on ‘reasonable ground’, has the
authority to put aforementioned suspects under surveillance, restrict their movement, and
place a temporary hold on suspected terror funds. Several proposals offered while the law
was under consideration included a range of extraordinary measures found in other
criminal laws such as detention and renewal of detention, yet were not among the
provisions ultimately enacted. In fact, the article limits the validity of such decisions to
one month giving the state the ability to closely monitor suspects, even if their links to
radical groups are loose; before applying tougher measures available in existing criminal
laws. Perhaps from the state point of view, rounding up suspects and exaggerating the
scope of potential threat, arguably have some deterrent value, thus provide added
security.

What also asserts the precise political nature of this legislation is that it falls short from
criminalizing acts of terrorism that are committed against foreign targets. For example, if
a group in Jordan is engaged in fundraising under the guise of operating as a charity, but
90

Article 148(2) of the Penal Code imposes a penalty of hard labor with a minimum five-year sentence for every
‘terrorist act.’
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Article 7 of the State Security Court Law of 1959 states that State Security Prosecutors and law enforcement
officers exercise their power in accordance with the Criminal Procedures Law no. 9 of 1961. However, State
Security Court prosecutor has the power to detain a suspect up to seven-days without charge (in ordinary criminal
cases the prosecutor must charge detainees within twenty-four hours and the criminal procedures law requires
“evidence” before the prosecutor can remand a suspect in custody.

44

in reality channels those funds to commit terror acts abroad or against a foreign target,
notwithstanding any Jordanian target or interest, then affiliation or association with such
a group is excluded from the scope of the law. In fact this has been in line with Jordan’s
policy in dealing with Hamas in 1999 when the government refused to permit Hamas
“military” wing members to reside or operate in the country but allowed other lowerlevel Hamas members who are engaged in the “political” and “social” wings to stay in
Jordan. However, Islamists in Jordan expressed their concern that the law might be
interpreted to apply to mere association with resistance movements in the region,
including Hamas and several Iraqi groups. Some Islamic Action Front members in
parliament proposed inserting a clause to explicitly exclude all forms of resistance against
occupation and struggle for national independence from acts of terrorism. To date, the
definition of acts of terrorism is rarely, if ever, enforced by the military court in its
verdicts or cited by the Court of Cassation in reviewing terrorist’s appeal. 92 Thus, it
remains for possible future use when it may be necessary or expedient to counter the
threat it was designed for.
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In September 2006, Jordan's State Security Court sentenced seven people to be executed for their involvement in
the 11/9 Amman bombings that triggered the issuance of the Prevention of Terrorism Law. However, the case was
decided based on the articles of Penal Code no. 16 of 1960 and the Firearms and Ammunition Law no. 34 of 1952.
All seven were found guilty of conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts causing death and destruction (Article 148(4) of
Penal Code), and illegal possession of weapons and explosives (Article 11(a) of Firearms Law). The key suspect is
the Iraqi woman Sajida Al-Rishawi, 35, who was arrested a few days after the blasts, which were carried out by
three Iraqis, including her husband. Rishawi confessed over the state-run Jordan television of being part of the
suicide gang, but alleged her belt failed to detonate at Radisson SAS, one of the targeted hotels. Rishawi was the
only defendant in custody; all others were tried in-absentia, including the Jordanian fugitive Al-Zarqawi. Rishawi
appealed immediately against her sentence. Initially, Rishawi said in a televised confession that her own belt failed
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to set off her bomb. She also claimed the confessions were extracted through torture but had no evidence of this. In
January 2007, Jordan's appeals court [“Court of Cassation”] said it “ratified” the military court's death sentence
because Rishawi was “guilty beyond doubt of possessing explosives and having had the intention and the will to
carry out terrorist attacks whose outcome is destruction and death.” The appeals court’s decision is final, but
according to the Constitution (Article 38/9), can be overturned by the King, the ultimate authority in Jordan. See,
Jordan
Hotel
Bomber
to
Hang,
Aljazeera
Network
(January
2007),
available
at:
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/01/2008525143626473340.html

45

b. Limiting Religious Space through Legislation
The second bundle of legislation that Jordan enacted as part of its legal response to the 11/9
attacks came in the form of legislation that was focused on the use of religion to legitimize
and mobilize recruits. In 2006, the government enacted two laws that aim to prevent radicals
from utilizing several mechanisms available within the religio-spatial structure of Islamic
rituals and community interaction that include, for the most part, mosque-related activities.

i)

The Law of Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 59 of 2006.
Amending law no. 7 of 1986.

Jordan has constantly understood the potential of mosques as an informal social platform to
disseminate ideology and mobilize collective action. 93 Particularly where the press and
publications are curtailed and constrained, the mosque becomes an important medium of
expression, at once religious, social, cultural and political, purveying a message wrapped in
religious symbolism. Thus, it is certainly not new for Jordan to exercise state control over
religious institutions. Like many states in the Middle East, Jordan has enacted a series of
measures and strategies to control Islamic religious discourse. The state’s reason for
regulating public religious fora was to help prevent the dissemination of “unorthodox”
Islamic views that are critical of the regime, thus inhibit oppositional elements from using
public religious space to mobilize dissent.
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At one point, the regime through it intelligence services utilized mosques as a recruitment drive of potential
volunteer fighters in the Afghan fight against the Soviet forces. As one Jordanian observer put it, the regime at one
point “persuaded young Jordanians to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets” through utilizing state-run mosques.
Interview by International Crisis Group with Samih Khreis, a trial lawyer involved in defending jihadis (March 30,
2005). See latter source cited supra note 41.
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In fact, Islamic institutions have been incorporated since the 1960s into the state bureaucracy
through the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs; namely the Department of Preaching and
Guidance. This means that all mosques and mosque-related activities, including Friday
sermons khutba, are controlled by the government. However, the government’s enforcement
of its religious policy derives from two main practices: Prevent oppositional figures from
using the mosque as a medium of opposition, and control the content of religious preaching.

In principle, mosques’ Imams are government employees assigned to mosques by the
ministry, with the intelligence services playing a critical role in their vetting and
appointment. Thus, the growth of mosques 94 has surpassed the government’s capabilities to
staff them with qualified imams and preachers. 95 According to official numbers, around 50
percent of the country’s 6000-plus awqaf-run mosques are without regime-appointed imams,
due largely to lack of funding and well-trained imams. 96 In addition to the awqaf-run
mosques, there are privately funded mosques that appoint their own imams, who practically
can preach uncensored sermons. It has always been a core question for the government how
to regulate these private mosques.

Clearly, the intelligence keeps an eye on who preaches and what is being preached,
regardless of whether mosques are state or privately funded. In addition, the Department of
Preaching and Guidance requests and reviews the names of prospective preachers; mainly

94

According to Jordan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs; Mosques grew in number from 2710 in 1999 to 6243 in
2008. Available at: http://www.awqaf.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=90
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Although, one of the main functions of the imam is to give the Friday sermon and religious lessons, yet not all
state-appointed imams are qualified. Thus, the important functions of an imam and preacher remain unfulfilled in a
substantial number of instances.
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As a result of this deficit, outside preachers are frequently brought in mainly to deliver the Friday sermon.
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before the weekly Friday sermon and has the discretion to deny permission to any preacher
without specifying reasons. 97 According to the law, individuals who violate the written ban
order are punished by imprisonment for a period of one week to one month or fined a sum of
US$28 - US$141. 98 Nevertheless, the law did not specify a ban period and left it open for the
minister to decide when and whether to lift the ban on a specific preacher. 99 More outspoken
or influential figures are banned for longer periods of time.

As for the control policy on preached material, it has been characterized by a certain degree
of informality. Article 3 of the law states that “the preacher should be committed to wisdom
and proper preaching and shall not attack, accuse, or instigate against individuals or
institutions and go beyond the guidelines of Islamic teachings.” The informal policy is to
prevent any actions that might undermine the regime and its legitimacy. There is a set of
unwritten but well-recognized rules that represent limits to behavior and action tolerated by
the regime. In general there are three regulative techniques that have been utilized to ensure
that sermons remain uncritical of the regime. Part of the ministry’s mandate is to suggest
topics for sermons, and often it requires imams and preachers to speak on certain apolitical
topics that do not instigate broader opposition throughout the community. 100 To keep matters
in perspective, the ministry rotates preachers between mosques to reduce the opportunity for
possible controversial oppositional figures from cultivating a loyal constituency. However,
those who cross the limits of preaching by criticizing state policy are first warned, if they
97

Article 7 of the Law of Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 7 of 1986, as amended in 2006, gives
the Minister of Religious Affairs unbounded authority to ban a certain preacher if he violates the provisions of this
law.
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In reality the punishment is often harsher and entails referral to intelligence services for interrogation and possible
detention.
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Article 7(c) of law no. 7 of 1986.
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During the 1970s, the ministry sent preachers complete sermons that could be used verbatim.
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continue, they get banned. And, if they violate the official ban order, they get punished
according to the law.

This practice of banning preachers became more common since Jordan signed its peace
treaty with Israel in 1994, which was a move that created widespread grassroots opposition.
As mentioned earlier, this opposition steered by the country’s own Muslim Brotherhood
movement, was viewed as potentially destabilizing, thus a threat to Jordan’s national
security. Under this national security blanket, intelligence intensified its surveillance and
started to detain political activists; mainly Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front
members. 101 The recent growth of Islamic opposition movements in the region following the
war on Iraq has prompted the Jordanian state to tighten its control on all mosques. According
to a Crisis Group report, in September 2004 the government arrested roughly thirty
mainstream imam, preachers and scholars for turning the mosques into “political meeting
halls that spreads anti-American sentiments. 102

However, mobilization and recruitment at mosques are difficult to regulate because regimes
cannot prevent people from praying. Following the November 2005 attacks, the government
introduced a substantial amendment to article 7 of the Law of Preaching, Guidance and
Teaching in Mosques. By this amendment the government has strengthened its efforts to
effectively control mosques, and religious space in general, by making the practice of
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Since the peace treaty, the state attempted to remove critical imams from their government positions. The case of
Salah Al-Khalidi is the most cited incident in which an imam, for ten years at a central mosque in a heavy populated
area, was removed from his position for vocally opposing the peace treaty. This incident was recognized by the
Islamic community as a move to crackdown on imams who oppose state policies.
102
See latter source cited supra note 41 at 15.
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prohibiting any individual from preaching or getting involved in any other mosque-related
activity the general rule. Article 7(a) articulated the state’s new policy of zero tolerance of
communicating or espousing radical ideologies through religious speech and ritual prior to
acquiring the written approval of the government i.e. minister of religious affairs. Permission
is contingent upon government approval of content, and this approval is only granted for
those who do not link religious practices to an agenda for political change, thus openly
criticize the state’s policies or oppose the pre-western regime. Through this approach, the
state seeks to minimize the mobilizing potential of the most important institution within
religious space that provides an opportunity to disseminate an ideological message and
muster support for a cause. However, the subsections concerning banning and punishing
preachers who receive permission to speak but cross tolerable limits remain unchanged.

Again, the question that comes to mind is; how effective is this regulative control of mosques
as physical structures. Do the limitations imposed on who operates within its context enough
to diminish the mobilization and recruitment effect of mosques? Arguably, its control has
substantially and significantly limited how the space can be effectively utilized. Perhaps the
state’s manipulation of bureaucratic processes, rules and procedures has succeeded in the
past in usurping the revolutionary or oppositional potential of traditional religious institutions
by blocking critical Islamic voices from participating in public discourse and mobilizing
political dissent. However, there are possible reasons to believe in the inefficiency of such an
approach in blocking radicals from disseminating their ideology through the use of mosques
as an informal arena for recruitment.
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Initially, mosques were considered the primary mobilization and recruitment site since it
provided radicals with an informal network of groups of people who are predisposed to
religious learning. Thus, formalizing such network by subjecting its operations to legal
restrictions and administrative practices makes it visible and vulnerable for repression; yet
diminish its tactical efficacy. Under such circumstances, radicals have two options: surrender
to state control and its management strategies, which would require radicals to make
concessions and limit their objectives. Given the ideological imperative that drives radicals’
modus operandi, and that of the Islamic movement in general, it seems impossible give up
their dogmatic trend. This leads to the second option; radicals would look for an institutional
alternative or reorient themselves toward other nodes to escape regulation and statecontrolled religious space.

Further, the state’s own mobilization of legal constraints and administrative apparatus to
limit the religious space is largely seen unpopular even among those considered to be
‘balanced’ thinkers. The use of hidden analogies and continued opposition by some of those
preachers and imams indicate that the state even after tightening its control does not enjoy
complete hegemony over the mosque and its religious space. Critical imams refer to the use
of religious symbols and analogies from Quran to discuss political topics and mobilize
opposition as a legal “loophole” in which the government cannot contradict or punish for.

Another significant reason that undoubtedly undermines the efficacy of the law is the
insufficiency of deterrent penalties. A maximum one month imprisonment for those who
violate the provisions of the law is unlikely to have any substantial deterrent effect upon
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neither them nor future violators. In fact, many of them might consider going into prison as
an opportunity to transmit radicals’ ideology through personal, face-to-face interactions
where they communicate, recruit, and educate. 103

ii)

The Religious Edict Law no. 60 of 2006.

A religious edict or Fatwa is a jurisprudential opinion based on Islamic Law. Though not
legally binding in a secular legal system, 104 fatwas are normally used within religious space
to lift ambiguity regarding contemporary issues by giving Islamic perspective. Generally, it
has a significant impact on Muslims’ understandings of the norms and rules that guide
behavior. Like most states throughout the Middle East, religious institutions that issue fatwas
are largely controlled by the state.

Before September 11, fatwas has become an instrument of the state to justify some of its
actions and policies that can be viewed by many Muslim communities as anti-Islamic. 105
Scholars outside such state-sponsored bodies i.e. Muslim Brotherhood do issue fatwas; yet it
was never a serious cause for concern. However, the utility of fatwas as instruments for
Islamic opposition started gaining prominence as terrorist groups, particularly Al-Qaeda
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Radicalization and extremist activities in prisons have been increasingly highlighted as of being of concern.
However, there has been no legal response to radicals’ activities in prison environment. See source cited supra note
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within the context of prisoners’ rehabilitation. The program aims to start a dialogue with those involved in the takfiri
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Alrai Newspaper (December 1, 2008).
104
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One of the most famous cases in which a government-controlled religious institution issued fatwas in support of
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Islamic groups that occupied the Ka’ba in the late 1970s.
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associated groups in Iraq, utilized in propagating their jihadi ideology against foreign
occupation and legitimizing their actions by making it seem part of an Islamic obligation.

Before the above legislation was issued, religious edicts were primarily dealt with under
article 7(c) of the Law of Preaching, Guidance and Teaching in Mosques no. 7 of 1986,
which stated that formal fatwas are issued by state-sponsored institutions and individuals.
The law was silent on legality issues relating to independent fatwas issued by non-state
scholars. A Council of Ifta established in accordance with a government directive was
charged inter alia with issuing fatwas. 106 The council is made up of individuals who are
financially and structurally dependent on the state. 107 .

The new legislation reinvigorated the state’s control over the Council’s work by establishing
an independent body, separate from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which governs the
Council and reports directly to the prime minister and parliament. Notably, the legislation
prohibits any individual or entity, beside the Council, from issuing fatwas on public matters
or undermining the validity of issued fatwas. 108 Nevertheless, when the bill was introduced
into parliament, it contained a penalty of up to one year imprisonment and a fine equivalent
to US$1400. Thus, the House of Representatives, lead by the Islamic block, vetoed the
penalty provision and passed the legislation without imposing any punishment.
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The Religious Edicts Directive no.17 of 1997.
Chief of Islamic courts, the general mufti, dean of the school of Sharia at the University of Jordan (public
university), the mufti of the armed forces, the director of the fatwa department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs,
and five Islamic scholars appointed by Cabinet for three years. See, article 5 of the Religious Edicts Directive no.17
of 1997.
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Hence, the government’s enactment of this legislation came to redefine the utility of fatwas
from an instrument used to justify state actions to one that denounces religious radicalism
and terrorism by offering religious refutations of the false interpretations of religious
extremists. Although such fatwas may not have a significant impact on current recruits or
reach the majority of terrorists, their more important role is seen in de-legitimating radicalism
and terror acts in the eyes of those whom radicals seek to recruit or appeal to for support.
Yet, politically radicalized and moderate Muslims may not recognize the fatwas that are
issued by such institution. Although religious leaders and scholars serving on the Council are
generally well-respected individuals in different areas of Islamic scholarship, yet they are
part of an institution that falls within the purview of the state. From this it follows that their
dependence on the state for their salaries and positions, undermines their religious authority
and present them as mere proponents of the state’s interpretation of Islam. 109

c. The Management of Collective Action
i)

Collective Action through civil society organizations

The state’s regulation of Islamic activism is inextricably linked to broader issues of social
control in the state, and the authoritarian tendencies are more apparent in the sphere of civil
society. In Jordan, the scope and content of social interaction is controlled through the use of
the bureaucratic processes, procedures and regulations. Generally, collective action is only
permitted through formal organizations. As the International Center for Nonprofit Law noted
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in a detailed 2005 report, 110 the application process for registering a new organization is
‘onerous.’ And, after passing through several levels of bureaucracy, the government
possesses veto power over all applications, and can cancel the registration of already licensed
organizations. In essence, the government can use its powers to block the formation of any
organization for political reasons.

A parallel pattern of Islamists activism in Jordan is done through civic organization and
formal institutionalism. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Islamic movement in Jordan took
advantage of its special relationship with the regime during martial law era to institutionalize
its presence through a variety of formal organizations. Most of these activities have operated
through the Islamic Center Charity Society, which serves as the charitable arm of the Islamic
movement.

Although none of these activities was political in nature, it grew to have a political effect.
The movement built schools, medical facilities, and a plethora of charitable societies. These
institutions provided the movement with a point of contact with communities and an
opportunity to promote a religious message through concrete projects. Furthermore, by
providing these social services for communities and predominantly Muslim members, the
movement was able to utilize the country’s largest charity network to mobilize political
support and reach new constituencies. This is no secret; both the regime and movement
members are well-aware of this organizational success. In fact, at different points in history
the regime has requested the movement to promote political stability through utilizing its
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high profile, and legitimacy to delegitimize the claims and ideologies of Islamic radical
groups that would espouse violence. 111 At the same time, the movement has benefited from
its expansion in civil society, especially after political liberalization in 1989, in developing
the country’s main political party.

Ever since political opposition took an Islamist discourse, the state has relied more
exclusively upon administrative techniques that have been already in place since the 1950s
and 1960s to diminish the prospect for opposition to mobilize within social space.
Nevertheless, the resurgence of hardliners within the movement’s leadership who have had
apparent affinities to foreign radical Islamic groups, and have recently led an increasingly
vocal opposition against state’s policies, was considered alarming. Informed by a concern
with controlling religious discourse, the regime decided to increase its already stringent
control over civil society organizations to prevent those radicals from using them as potential
vehicles for mobilization and recruitment. However, the political reality on the ground
prevents the state from issuing a list of designated foreign terror organizations similar to the
blacklist published by the United States Department of State or the European Union or
declaring certain organizations as such based on their identification with other radical groups.
In view of that, in the post-11/9 period, the state’s plan was to reassert its claim over existing
system of control that renders collective action predictable by subjecting the financial sources
of charitable organizations to further scrutiny and legal measures.
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As aforementioned, the legal basis for the disciplinary power of the state is not new. The Law
of Societies and Social Organizations no. 33 of 1966 was, until recently, the law applicable to
the establishment and operation of voluntary organizations, both foreign and national, in the
kingdom. 112 The legislation provided the state with broad inspection powers to ensure that
organizations’ financial resources are not channeled to finance illegal activities that lie
outside state’s control or are terror-related. In the event an organization wanders beyond
legislative confines, particularly failure to provide information that impairs the government’s
surveillance powers, the government has the power to dissolve the organization, or
reorganize its leadership structure. For instance, in July 2006 the Ministry of Social
Development installed temporary government management of the Islamic Center Charity
Society, and a year later led a massive recruitment of new members to oust the Center’s
Muslim Brotherhood leadership in members’ elections for a new management. 113

However, there are no guidelines or limitations on the right of organizations to raise funds,
especially foreign funding. By law no organization can affiliate with any foreign organization
without the express permission of the government, the assumption has been that this rule
could expand to cover funding. 114 Thus, violation of this law carried a penalty of up to three
months imprisonment and US$70 fine.
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Driven by its fear from the growing influence of foreign radical Islamists, in addition to
deteriorating domestic economic conditions, the government took a number of steps to
tighten its financial control over charitable organizations. The new Societies Law, 115 which
came into force in December 2008, aims to: offset the growing influence of the Islamic
movement on mainstream society by restricting the scale of their charity operations, and
cutoff the dependence of some charitable organizations on outside funding.

The legislation works to improve the system of financial disclosure and transparency through
rendering all financial aspects of a society visible and subject to the surveillance of the state.
Therefore, the law bans all licensed organizations from receiving foreign aid, except with the
permission of the government. 116 In case an organization violates this prohibition, the
government may decide to return, take possession of funds, in addition to imposing other
penalties prescribed by law. Hence, foreign organizations that are authorized under same
licensing procedures face an added prohibition from soliciting charitable contributions or
receiving funds from local sources without the express permission of the government. 117

By and large, if an organization fails to disclose its financial sources, allocations and
expenditures 118 or committed infractions to the law or its bylaw, the government, at its
discretion, issues a notice of violation, if the violation persists, it has the power to appoint a
temporary board of directors to run the organization until a new board of directors is
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elected. 119 Moreover, the government has the power to dissolve the organization if it
commits the violation for a second time and does not correct it within a two-month period.
Like the previous legislation, it imposes penalties on those who violate its provisions;
however, in the new legislation offences are expanded and penalties increased. Article 26(b)
and (c) imposes a fine up to US$7000 on the person who was responsible for failure to
disclose or report received funds from local sources. A fine up to US$14000 fine or a
minimum three months in prison, or both penalties are imposed in case the received funds
were foreign.

Some organizations in Jordan are registered as non-profit corporations, which have given
them leeway to operate under a less restrictive law on Companies. 120 Notably, such nonprofit organizations have had the power to determine in the articles of association their
sources of funding, including receiving foreign aid. Under the new law, this option is no
longer available since all such organizations are required to conform to the new legislation
within one year from the date the law has gone into force, 121 or else it would be subject to
dissolution. 122

To date, the legislation has faced immense criticism. The state is under pressure to review the
law not only from Islamists who described the law as being “martial” and intended for
undermining the role of Islamic charity in the country, but also by Western charities; mainly
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Christian groups 123 who now require official approval, and their finances 124 and transactions
are subject to government scrutiny.

ii)

Alternative forms of collective action

Another aspect of Jordan’s management of social control addresses other collective action
alternatives that operate outside the structure of formal organizations. The state attempts to
repress unregistered groups activism within different socio-demographic niches of society, in
addition to collective action that falls outside the regulative capacity of formal organizations.
The state has therefore taken measures to limit the occurrence of such activities and reduce
the effect of those that are permitted.

The state is mainly concerned with demonstrations or public gatherings of a political nature;
not including meetings permitted through political parties. To avoid undesirable potential
outcomes of demonstrations such as charging silent voices with radical opposition to
government’s policies, or dissipating into unpredictable forms of violent protests following a
123
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Friday sermon or an approved meeting, the state requires that such forms of social interaction
be performed through spaces that are within the reach of state’s administrative practices. This
state policy is based on the Law of Public Meetings of 1953, which is a regulative holdover
from martial era. The law stipulated that individuals must obtain permission to hold a public
meeting defined as “any meeting called to discuss political matters.” 125 In 2004, part of the
government’s promised political reforms to shore up its popularity in the face of domestic
discontent and defuse international criticism; the government issued a new law 126 that
introduced a different language while keeping the legal mechanisms and authoritarian
practices intact. 127

However, the 2005 terrorist bombings in Amman and Islamists electoral success in
Palestinian and Egyptian legislative elections in 2005 and 2006 have contributed to the
growing anxiety of the state vis-à-vis radicalization within Islamists ranks who would utilize
such impromptu demonstrations to disseminate a radical religious ideology. Not only do such
events jeopardize the state’s stability and control, but also their visibility often creates
momentum and energizes a radical base of supporters. Despite the rhetoric of democracy, the
state reasserted its social control and repression through introducing in 2008 an amendment
to the law of Public Meetings 128 in which it redefines “public meetings” in a manner that
limits dissent, opposition and any informal form of activism against state public policies.
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Wrapped in the sanctity of furthering public freedoms, 129 the new legislation kept the basic
limitation on demonstrations; organizers must obtain the permission from the district
governor after submitting an application that includes detailed information about the time,
place, and purpose of the demonstration, in addition to the names, addresses and signatures
of the organizers. 130 It also provided for the same penalties to be imposed on those who
violate its provisions. However, the legislation contained two substantial amendments to the
original text. First, amended article 7 is riddled with vague language that is subject to broader
interpretation and implementation. The article grants the district governor discretionary
power to end a demonstration if it evolves into what might endanger the lives or public or
private property or threatens public order. In the original text, such discretional authority
was restricted to the conditions of the given permit. As for the second amendment, article 9
extends the authority given to law enforcement officers to end a demonstration or bring back
order and security, to include intelligence services. It is worth to note that intelligence forces
have had a continued, ongoing heavy presence, and have infiltrated and closely monitored
public gatherings in the past, yet it was a de facto power that was never articulated in
legislation. This new language is certainly associated with Jordan’s counter-ideological
response to terror threat; sending a deterrent rather than an operational message to radical
Islamists’ sympathizers.

The propensity to control alternative forms of collective action could include any form of
mobilization that is not necessarily radical in nature, thus be used toward the suppression of

129

Article 3(a) excluded a number of formal meetings from the scope of application of the law. Hence, the excluded
meetings are all well-regulated under special laws e.g. Societies Law no. 51 of 2008, Political Parties Law no. 19 of
2007.
130
Article 4 of law no. 7 of 2004, as amended 2008.

62

political opposition. For instance, in spite of low internet penetration rate, 131 the Islamic
movement in Jordan is using websites and individualized online platforms such as blogs, as
an alternative form of activism to adapt to the increasingly restrictive legal measures that are
being justified under the pretext of terrorism. 132 Thus far, the state has not taken any specific
measure to raise the level of visibility of activists in the Jordanian blogosphere, but
interpreted that existing restrictive measures apply to online activism. 133 Given that the
global source of threat comes from a relatively small group of radical Islamists, who rely
heavily on information technology to reach millions of people, disseminate ideological
themes, and recruit new supports; 134 under these developments the state may desire to
maintain its hegemony over online media activism. Thus, to maintain constant surveillance,
the state may develop administrative apparatus and regulation against a counter-public sphere
of discourse that has the potential to penetrate and radicalize mainstream. 135

C. Conclusion
In the aftermath of 9/11, criminal law reform in Jordan was part of the worldwide expansion of
criminal laws facilitated by UNSC Resolution 1373 that was enacted under mandatory Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. The introduced criminal law amendments were largely offered as a
symbolic response to 9/11, it was built on the assumption of inadequacy of criminal law without
131
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fully understanding the dimensions of deterrence. Probably with the exception of the new laws
against the financing of terrorism, the state had a whole range of extraordinary measures
available if not morally, then practically to counter terrorism.

Jordan also took advantage of the political circumstances to extend the scope of its measures of
legal control while cooperating with the United States and its western allies in the “war on
terror.” It was clear not too long before the events of September 11, 2001 that the government
did not intend to move toward further political and social reforms. The regime’s vision of a new
Jordan defined by its modern, pro-Western political, economic and cultural agenda was at odds
with the exigencies of national security and stability, domestically and regionally. Opposition
from all political trends, including Islamists, made it clear that public opinion has arrived at an
unprecedented state of agreement on opposing state’s policies that are fundamentally political in
nature, along with economic and social aspects that cannot be ignored. However, in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Islamic movement per se was dealt with in no separate
trajectory than that of mainstream political opposition. It was in 2004 that the state’s anxiety visà-vis radicalization within its own Islamic movement’s ranks started to reflect on its terrorism
policy.

In 2005, following the terrorist bombings in Amman, the state announced its new counterideological approach that is primarily focused on the Islamist movement opposition, its foreign
allegiance, and essentially, its role in mobilizing a radical political opposition. The counterideological approach had three arms: a) special terrorism legislation that establishes the concept
of collective responsibility and punishment as a deterring element to prevent new recruits; b)
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controlling the minutiae of religious activity in the kingdom through regulating Islamic space
and rituals. The regime attempts to produce a depoliticized and non-radical interpretation of
Islam, at the same time mobilize religious institutions to promote its interests; c) management of
collective action through controlling social platforms and possible alternative forms that expose
mainstream Islamists to those who may offer them alternative ideologies and alternative courses
of action, even terrorism. Evidently, the legal provisions of this counter-ideological approach
provided a legal and regulative rather than punitive framework, heretofore, had minimal
deterrent value in terms of imposed penalties.

Such an approach inevitably raises questions of civil liberties, since it could be directed at those
who may share with radical Islamists political goals, though not their means, but because they do
not operate secretly are easier targets for the state. Although, the state has been relatively
restrained in its use of these restrictive powers, the provision’s can be implemented at any
moment given the extreme circumstances in the region. Jordanian officials often argue that any
restrictive measures are actually quite moderate, when compared to most other states in the
region. Hence, some conservative voices from the liberal West seem to justify the use of such
measures by authoritarian but useful regimes, saying that these measures are certainly no harsher
than many of other widely used coercive tools in the global campaign against radical Islamists
terrorism.

Demonstrating the Jordanian counter-ideological approach was an attempt to find out whether
such legal measures would lead to greater radicalization, perhaps terrorism against its own
society, as well as foreign targets, or whether it would translate to political disengagement or
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disaffection. In theory, to answer this question we must differentiate between two possible
audiences; radical Islamists who utilize instrumental political causes within social and religious
space to mobilize new recruits, and Islamic opposition who represent legitimate dissent. In terms
of radical Islamists, such group depends primarily on informal networks that operate outside
state controlled organizational space to connect like-minded Islamists to one another as they
promote their radical message of religious change. The reliance on face-to-face interactions
through informal networks is most likely the reason why such groups tend to mobilize through
religious and social activities within civil society. To a certain extent, the state’s restrictive body
of legislation tends to constrain their reach, reduce the message and mobilizing effect on main
stream Islamists; however, radicals will always seek alternative informal structures to transmit its
message of change.

As for legitimate political dissent, which happens to take an Islamic discourse, the state’s
restrictive measures may ultimately serve to alienate the moderates who currently make up the
overwhelming majority of its activists and drive them toward radicalism, thus empowering the
radical Islamists. However, this renders relative moderation more of a political challenge than
radical Islamist forms of political mobilization itself.

***
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